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I n an opinion that gave an extensive review of the evo-
lutionary development of federal 
privilege law, the United States 
Supreme Court resolved a conflict 
among the circuits by recognizing 
an absolute psychotherapist-patient 
privilege. In Jaffee v. Redmond, 
116 S. Ct. 1923 (1996), the Court 
held that Federal Rule of Evidence 
501 authorizes federal courts to 
extend a privilege to confidential 
communications between licensed 
psychotherapists and their patients 
made during the course of diagno-
sis or treatment. In so holding, the 
Court left open to case-by-case 
interpretation the delineation of the 
privilege's scope. 
On June 17, 1991, respondent 
Mary Lu Redmond, ("Redmond"), 
a police officer for the Village of 
Hoffman Estates, Illinois, re-
sponded to a "fight in progress" 
call at an apartment complex. 
Redmond was the first officer to 
arrive at the scene, where onlook-
ers informed her that a stabbing 
had occurred. While awaiting the 
arrival of an ambulance and sup-
port officers, Redmond observed 
Ricky Allen, Jr. emerging from the 
apartment complex chasing an-
other man. Believing that Allen 
was about to stab the man, 
Redmond ordered Allen to drop 
the weapon. When he continued to 
ignore her, Redmond fired her 
service revolver, fatally wounding 
Allen, who died at the scene. 
Carrie Jaffee ("Jaffee"), the 
administrator of Allen's estate, 
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filed suit against b.oth Redmond 
and the Village of Hoffman Estates 
in U.S. District Court. She sought 
damages for the death of her son 
under federal and state statutes, 
claiming that Redmond had vio-
lated Allen's constitutional rights 
by use of excessive force. Upon 
learning that Redmond had re-
ceived therapy after the shooting, 
Jaffee attempted to discover 
records of conversations between 
Redmond and clinical social 
worker Karen Beyer. Despite 
Redmond's assertion that a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege 
protected the communications, the 
district court judge ordered disclo-
sure of the records. When both 
Redmond and Beyer refused to 
comply with the order, the trial 
judge instructed the jury that they 
could presume Redmond's failure 
to submit the documents was based 
on her desire to keep out injurious 
information. As a result, the jury 
awarded Jaffee damages under 
both the federal and state law 
claims. 
The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed the district court, holding 
that recognition of a qualified 
psychotherapist-patient privilege 
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was required under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501. Declaring that the 
privilege would apply only if a 
patient's privacy interest out-
weighed the court's need for evi-
dence, the court applied the bal-
ancing test to the case at bar, and 
found that Redmond's interest in 
protecting the confidential records 
outweighed the evidentiary need. 
The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and affirmed the 
court of appeals' recognition of the 
privilege. The Court, however, 
rejected the lower court's case-by-
case balancing approach to its 
application. 
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, 
the Court began by acknowledging 
that Congress, in enacting Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501, intended for 
federal courts to delineate new 
privileges according to the princi-
ples established by the common 
law, and "'in the light of reason 
and experience.'" Jaffee, 116 S. 
Ct. at 1927 (quoting Wolfe v. 
United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 
(1934)). At common law, testimo-
nial privileges were disfavored 
because of the principle that "'the 
public has a right to every man's 
evidence. '" Id. at 1928 (quoting 
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 
323, 331 (1950) (quoting 8 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 2192, p. 64 
(3d ed. 1940))). This rule would 
allow no exceptions unless war-
ranted by a transcendent public 
good. Id. (citing Trammel v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 
(1980) (quoting Elkins v. United 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 37 
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States, 364 U.S. 206,234 (1960))). 
Emphasizing that reason and expe-
rience necessitated recognition of 
the privilege, the Court reasoned 
that the shielding of confidential 
psychotherapist-patient communi-
cations from discovery furthered 
interests important enough to out-
weigh a court's need for probative 
evidence. Id (citing Trammel, 445 
U.S. at 51 (1980)). 
The Court analogized the 
psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship to that of attorney and client 
and that of spouses, stating that an 
atmosrhp.re of trust that fosters 
complete disclosure is essential to 
all of these relationships. Id at 
1928. Thus, the Court reasoned, 
the privilege furthers the important 
private interest of encouraging 
frank communications between 
psychotherapist and patient. Id at 
1929. 
Furthermore, because the com-
mon law makes clear that a privi-
lege must also serve a public good, 
the Court examined the societal 
benefit promoted by the 
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
Id (citing Upjohn v. United States, 
449 U.S. 383 (1981)). Determin-
ing that a public good is promoted 
when citizens are encouraged to 
seek treatment for mental or emo-
tional problems, the Court con-
cluded that the privilege complies 
with the common-law mandate. 
Id at 1929. 
The Court next reasoned that it 
is appropriate for federal courts to 
recognize a psychotherapist-
patient privilege because some 
form of the privilege has been 
enacted into law in all fifty states. 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 38 
Id The Court noted that the 
States' protection against com-
pelled disclosure would be 
meaningless if not credited by 
federal courts. Id at 1930. 
Rejecting Jaffee's argument that 
the Court should disregard States' 
adoption of the privilege because 
legislatively promulgated, and 
therefore politically influenced, the 
Court acknowledged that such 
policy determinations by state 
legislatures reflect both reason and 
experience. Id (citing Funk v. 
United States, 190 U.S. 371, 376-
81 (1933)). 
To further bulwark the Court's 
recognition of the privilege, Justice 
Stevens referred to the Advisory 
Committee's inclusion of a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege 
in its original draft of Rule 501. 
The proposed rule included nine 
express privileges, but was re-
jected in favor of the more flexible 
rule that Congress eventually 
adopted. Id at 1930. 
Noting the significant amount 
of mental health treatment pro-
vided by licensed social workers, 
the Court made clear that the privi-
lege extends not only to psychia-
trists and psychologists, but 
equally to confidential 
communications made between 
licensed social workers and their 
patients in the course of diagnosis 
or treatment. Id at 1931. 
Significantly, the Court refused 
to condition the privilege upon a 
balancing of the court's eviden-
tiary need and the patient's privacy 
need, explaining that this would 
result in uncertainty of application, 
thus destroying the privilege's 
benefit. Id at 1932 (citing Up-
john, 449 U.S. at 393). 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice 
Scalia declared the scope of the 
new privilege to be ill-defined. He 
criticized the majority's premise 
that the private and public interests 
served by the privilege are impor-
tant enough to override the court's 
need for evidence and questioned 
the majority's conclusion that rec-
ognition of the privilege will result 
in more open communications. Id 
at 1934. Justice Scalia protested 
the Court's reliance upon state 
privilege law, contending that leg-
islatively enacted testimonial ex-
ceptions should not provide guid-
ance for judicial interpretation of 
the common law. Id at 1935-36. 
Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that 
the inclusion of licensed social 
workers within the definition of 
"psychotherapist" is a matter best 
left to Congress, not to the Court. 
Id at 1940. 
In Jaffee v. Redmond, the 
United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged the existence of a 
psychotherapist -patient privilege 
for the first time. Although Mary-
land's General Assembly had al-
ready provided for a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege 
in the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article section 9-109 of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, the 
decision affords patients who seek 
counseling in Maryland the ad-
ditional certainty that the privilege 
will be honored in federal courts. 
